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Abstract
I develop a model of activism and polarization in the context of electoral competition. Two
candidates simultaneously announce policy platforms and seek the support of ideologically
inclined activists. Activists compete to influence electoral outcomes by expending costly sup-
port for their respective candidates. The presence of activists always moderates the platform
choice of candidates, compared to the case of no activism. The main finding is to provide con-
ditions under which as activists’ ideological partisanship increases (decreases), polarization
of candidate platforms reduces (widens) - meaning candidates may compromise even though
their supporters become more extreme. I precisely characterize the conditions under which the
presence of activism and increasing partisanship among activists are both welfare-improving
for voters. Finally, I identify a novel crowding out effect of big money on the demand for
activism. My analysis suggests public funding of elections as an important institutional reform
that could mitigate the pernicious effects of high polarization.
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1 Introduction
“People at the top might devote time and resources to supporting a political party
strongly opposed to redistribution. People at the bottom would have an opposite re-
sponse.” McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (Polarized America, 2006)
Activism is an important channel of political participation in representative democracies. Ac-
tivists belonging to either sides of the political spectrum participate in campaigns to influence
voters’ preferences about the platforms of candidates and therefore affect the electoral prospects
of candidates. Further, this form of political activism is mostly ideological and partisan in nature
(e.g., Aldrich (1983a)). Activists follow the ideological agenda set by their preferred candidate
(or party) and provide their support during elections, without trying to directly set the platforms
of candidates.1 However, by indirectly affecting the prospects of candidates in this way, activists
influence their choice of platforms. Therefore, the mere presence of activists changes the nature of
political competition and the extent of platform polarization.
Several instances of political activism can be cited. For example, Obama’s 2008 and 2012
campaigns were propelled by grass-roots activists and mobilization. Activists belonging to the
Tea Party movement played a crucial role in the Republicans winning back the House of Repre-
sentatives in the 2010 mid-term elections.2 Outside the US context, the 2015 state elections in
New Delhi saw a fledgling party AAP win 95% of the seats by promising a platform of ending
governmental corruption and nepotism. The campaign witnessed mass participation by grass roots
activists and volunteers who were able to influence voters’ preferences towards supporting the
newly formed party.3
Given the importance and relevance of activism for political competition, it is surprising that
there is little theoretical literature on political activism. Most of the literature has extensively
studied the role of interest groups and lobbies (e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1996, 1999, 2001)).
However, there is a fundamental distinction that has been ignored. Unlike lobbies, activists do not
commit to policy-contingent (implicit) contracts. Rather, activists support a candidate taking as
given the policy platforms announced by the candidate. This inability to commit to platform contin-
gent support changes the nature of incentives and provides for novel trade-offs. Aldrich (1983a,b),
in his seminal work, provides a rational-choice explanation for participation in activism. Though
Aldrich’s work provides a framework for studying the motivations for becoming an activist, ques-
tions of how partisan activism influences political platforms and what affects the extent of activism
remain pertinent, yet unanswered.
1The typical role of partisan activists include persuading voters, donating money, helping with door-to-door can-
vassing and leafleting, attending the national party convention, and mobilizing voters through grass-roots campaigning.
See Norris (2007).
2More recently, Bernie Sanders’ campaign against the Democratic party’s front runner Hillary Clinton witnessed
grass-roots participation from a wide array of activists.
3In the 1990’s, a similar activism led campaign by right-wing groups led to the formation of the first successful
non-Congress national government in India, almost 50 years after its Independence.
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My paper attempts to bridge this gap in the literature by developing a model of activism to shed
light on the relationship between activism and platform polarization. I consider a Downs-Hotelling
setup that captures the role of activists, the voting decisions of voters, and candidates’ platform
selection in an unified framework. My model incorporates three key features: i) candidates care
about ideology and benefits of office (they are “responsible”, in the spirit of Calvert (1985) and
Wittman (1983)); ii) activists are ideological price-takers ; and iii) activists persuade voters but
face participation costs.
The political process proceeds as follows: candidates simultaneously announce platforms,
party activists expend effort to influence voters given the set of platforms, and (median) voter de-
cides whom to vote for; in that order. Candidates, when announcing platforms, and activists, when
deciding on levels of participation, are unaware of the median voter’s preferred policy, which is
drawn from a uniform distribution. Activist participation plays a role of direct influence and their
effort affects the median voter’s preferences.4 Two important trade-offs emerge in this setup. Can-
didates trade off their ideology to elicit greater participation from activists, and activists trade off
benefits from participation and the costs of doing so. Together, these twin trade-offs deliver a novel
set of results.
First, I find that political polarization decreases in the presence of party activists, compared to
settings with no activists. The result is driven by the fact that when activists are price-takers, they
punish both their own candidate (by reducing effort) and the other candidate (increasing effort) for
polarizing. As a result, competition between activists decreases equilibrium political polarization,
irrespective of the activists’ ideological preferences. This suggests that unlike organized lobbies
and interest groups (see Grossman and Helpman (2001, 1996)), the presence of activists moderates
platforms and brings about political compromise. An important implication of this result is that
activism disciplines the platform choice of candidates in electoral democracies. They do so by not
only restricting the extent to which their preferred candidate polarizes, but by how much the other
side polarizes as well.5
Second, I characterize the relationship between increased partisanship between activists and
platform polarization of candidates. This relationship is important given the current nature of the
polarization debate in US politics.6 The main contribution of my work is the finding that increased
partisanship between activists does not necessarily increase platform polarization of candidates.
The nature of this relationship is determined by the activists’ willingness to engage in the political
4See Norris (2002), Chapter 6, Table 6.4 for empirical evidence of a persuasive effect of campaign activism. More
recently, Madestam et al. (2013) find evidence from the tea party activism of 2010 for a similar persuasive role. In this
paper, I treat this kind of persuasive activism as analogous to influence seeking behavior in organizations (Milgrom
(1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1988)).
5In some sense, this kind of punishment for polarization is the opposite of what Vira´g (2008) uncovers.
6A cursory look at electoral campaigns in the US, especially from the 1960’s onwards, suggests a widening
polarization between the elected representatives of the two major parties. For example, McCarthy, Poole and Rosenthal
(2006), henceforth MPR, record this increasing polarization by looking at the roll-call votes in both the US Senate
and House of representatives. They find a growing divide between Democrats and Republicans across issues, and a
decrease in moderates in both chambers of the US congress.
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process. Specifically, when activists’ willingness to engage in the political process exceeds a criti-
cal threshold, increased partisanship leads to greater convergence in candidate platforms, resulting
in reduced political polarization.
The intuition for this result is the following. Activists trade off the marginal effect of higher
participation and the marginal costs of doing so. As activists become more extreme and the willing-
ness exceeds a threshold, the marginal costs of participation increases but is concave. Candidates
understand these trade-offs. Specifically, when one candidate polarizes, the activist supporting
that candidate reduces participation. Further, the opposing activist increases participation since the
marginal benefit of increased activism is positive. When the elasticity exceeds the critical thresh-
old, these effects are stronger. This decreases the benefits accruing to a candidate from polarizing,
resulting in reduced political polarization in equilibrium.
Next, I investigate the effect of activist polarization on voters’ ex-ante welfare. There are two
important sets of results. The first pertains to the introduction of activists and its effect on welfare.
The second is the relationship between voter welfare and the level of activist polarization. From a
normative angle, my analysis indicates that as long as the level of divergence in the absence of ac-
tivism exceeds a threshold (the ex-ante welfare maximizing level of polarization), the introduction
of activism can improve overall voter welfare. However, the presence of activists could also hurt
voters: When the candidates already offer similar political choices, introducing activists makes the
platforms converge further, to the point that it hurts voters’ welfare.
On a similar vein, as activists themselves polarize, the platforms of candidates could either
diverge or converge. Depending on the extent of the resulting polarization, this may increase or
decrease voter welfare. I precisely characterize the conditions under which increasing (decreas-
ing) activist polarization decreases (increases) the welfare of voters. The intuition is the following.
When activists’ elasticity of engagement is high enough, increased partisanship between activists
decreases polarization of platforms by candidates. However, when the prevailing levels of po-
larization are already below the socially optimum level, as candidates moderate their platforms
even further, the overall (ex-ante) welfare of voters decreases. This result suggests that democratic
societies with greater barriers to political participation could actually benefit from increased parti-
sanship among the political activists, when the existing choices provided by candidates are highly
similar.
In Section 5, I consider two extensions. First, I investigate the role of activism in a noisy cam-
paign, in the sense of Austen-Smith (1987). Activism, instead of influencing voters’ utility, plays
an informative role. The median voter observes an imperfect (noisy) signal of the actual platform,
and greater activism reduces the variance of this noise, rendering platforms more informative. The
elasticity of engagement in this case is dependent on the efficiency of activism (in reducing the
noise of platforms) and the participation-cost aversion of activists. The results in this modified
setup are similar to the original game. Specifically, the noisy campaign game yields a unique
equilibrium and the comparative statics results do not change.
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Finally, I study the role of big money in the electoral competition game. Apart from seeking
the support of party activists, suppose candidates are also endowed with campaign money (e.g. big
donors, organized PACs or super PACs), which can be used as alternate resources for influencing
voter preferences. That is, suppose that money and activist participation both perform similar roles
and are substitutable goods. In this setting, my analysis suggests a novel crowding-out effect of
big money on activism: a greater pool of resources decreases dependence on activism and reduces
participation of activists, resulting in more polarized platforms. That is, the inability of activists
to commit to policy-contingent contracts in exchange for resources is critical for achieving greater
compromise.
My analysis suggests that introducing public funding of elections could be useful as a poten-
tial policy intervention. Public funding restricts the resources available to a candidate, limiting
the crowding-out effect of big money. Capping the extent of campaign finance and restricting the
influence of big money would help shorten the length of the campaign cycle, and increase the de-
mand for grass-roots political activism. This way, the political process restores the dependence of
candidates on activists and engenders greater consensus in the polity, resulting in reduced platform
polarization.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss related literature. Section 3 presents
the benchmark model and characterizes the equilibrium of the electoral game. Section 4 analyzes
the main result. Section 5 details the welfare results and Section 6 presents two extensions to the
model. Concluding remarks follow in Section 7. All proofs are confined to the appendix.
2 Related Literature
Median voter convergence with office-motivated candidates, as propagated by Downs (1957) and
Black (1986), has been widely considered a benchmark for the analysis of political competition.
Subsequent work has however shown, under different conditions, the emergence of platform diver-
gence in equilibrium. My paper is related to models of electoral competition that induce platform
separation.7 Specifically, my paper looks into electoral activism as a possible channel for diver-
gence.
My results on the welfare effects of polarization have a similar foundation to the work of
Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani (2009) (henceforth BDS). BDS consider the case for respon-
sible parties in the presence of uncertainty around the median voter’s ideal policy. They present
an important normative result – a small level of polarization actually improves voter welfare by
increasing the platform choice available to voters. I introduce political participation (through ac-
tivists) to this setup and consider the impact of activist polarization and participation on candidate
platforms.
7See Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani (2007), Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997), Gul and
Pesendorfer (2009), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), Aragones and Palfrey (2002).
5
The role of activism in my work is similar to the models of influence studied by Milgrom
(1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1988), and Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992). While they study
influence seeking in organizations, I apply analogous ideas to model political competition with
activism. In my work, activists engage with voters in order to influence their choice of candidate,
and further, this engagement in influence seeking is costly for the activists. This brings about a
novel trade off between the activists’ preferences and the extent of participation.
This paper is also related to the work on political participation of voters. On the theoretical
side, this strand of literature could be broadly categorized into two classes of turnout models8
– turn-out driven by costly voting (Riker and Ordeshook (1968), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983,
1985), Morton (1991), and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006b,a)) and turnout driven by candidates
or activists (Shachar and Nalebuff (1999), Herrera and Martinelli (2006), Herrera, Levine and
Martinelli (2008), Feddersen and Gul (2014)). Of these, the models closest to my setup are those
by Herrera and Martinelli (2006) and Herrera, Levine and Martinelli (2008). My model of activism
differs from this in two ways. Firstly, my paper is not a model of turnout but one of costly influence.
Secondly, the effort is borne not by candidates but by activists who belong to their party. The main
question I address is the relationship between partisan activism and candidate platforms.
My model is also closely related to the work on direct informative role9 of campaign spend-
ing, notably Austen-Smith (1987). In Austen-Smith (1987), candidates simultaneously announce
policy, and elicit contributions from two firms. While Austen-Smith considers an informative role
of campaign contributions, I instead focus on the persuasive role of activism.10 The motivation for
activism is purely ideological and therefore, activists in my setup are committed to supporting only
one of the parties.
My paper is also related to the vast literature on campaign contributions and influence seeking
by interest groups or lobbies (Baron (1994, 1989), Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1999, 1996)),
Bernheim and Whinston (1986), and Austen-Smith (1995)). Activists are different from lobbies
in the sense that they do not exert direct control over platforms, but rather act as intermediaries in
the political competition process. Further, political activism is partisan in nature whereas lobbies
typically donate to both sides of the political spectrum.
3 Model
Candidate Preferences. Two candidates L and R, who care about ideology and benefits of of-
fice, contest elections on an unidimensional policy space [−1,1]. Candidate L has an ideal point
pL =−α and candidate R has an ideal point pR = α , where α ∈ (0,1). The candidates simultane-
8See Herrera, Morelli and Nunnari (2015) and Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey (2014) for work that relates turnout to
institutional arrangements.
9Coate (2004) presents an alternate model of informative campaign spending.
10We extend our model to include noisy campaigns, and show that the fundamental predictions on equilibrium
polarization and activist participation holds. See Section 6.
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ously announce policy Xi (where i∈ {L,R}), and the winning candidate enjoys benefits from office,
b > 0. The winner implements the ex-ante chosen policy. The candidates’ utility as a function of
the policy pair X= (XL,XR) is given by,
Ui(X, pi) =
{
−(Xi− pi)2+b if i wins
−(X−i− pi)2 otherwise
Activist Preferences. After platforms are announced, the candidates seek the support of activists
AL and AR, each supporting candidate L and R respectively. I assume that the ideological prefer-
ences of activists are unknown when candidates choose their platforms. The two activists have
symmetric ideological preferences given by −β and β respectively, where β ∈ [β ,1] is drawn
from a distribution with cdf F and a differentiable density f with full support.11 Activists con-
tribute to the electoral process by making a costly effort/participation decision. This is captured by
a convex cost function, m(ci), such that m
′
> 0,m
′′
> 0,m(0)≥ 0,m′(0)> 0. Let γm(ci) = ci.m
′′
m′
be
defined as the elasticity of marginal cost of participation for activists.12
Candidates are uncertain about the ideological distance between activists13, 2β . For example,
a greater β could be interpreted as more extreme views (on the right and left) on tax policy, gay
rights, minimum wages, and so on. Given β , the mobilization ci is very loosely defined to capture
any form of contribution by activists. Broadly, any measure of time, effort, or money spent on
endorsing and campaigning for the candidate could be accounted for by the variable ci. Let C =
(cL,cR) be a pair of activist contributions. The utility of an activist with bliss point pAi is given by,
UAi(X,ci, pAi) =
{
−(XL− pAi)2−m(ci) if L wins
−(XR− pAi)2−m(ci) if R wins
Voter Preferences. There is a continuum of voters v ∈ [−1,1] distributed uniformly. After
candidates announce platforms and activists decide on contributions, the voters experience a shock
µ distributed uniformly14 on [−σ ,σ ] that shifts their ideal points. The final bliss point of a voter
with an initial ideology v becomes θv = v+ µ . The utility function of voters consists of two
11The assumption of symmetry in activist ideologies is a simplifying one. It ensures that the equilibrium is sym-
metric and unique, and helps enunciating the main result clearly. Relaxing the symmetry assumption by allowing
activists to be drawn from different distributions with different support needlessly muddles the analysis without pro-
viding much additional value. However, introducing asymmetry is potentially an important direction in which future
research could be directed.
12This provides a measure analogous to risk aversion, except that it measures the elasticity of the marginal costs
involved with participation.
13Aldrich refers to this partisan identification as “party cleavages”.
14The results hold for any generic symmetric distributions around the ex-ante median.
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components - a purely ideological component of policy announcement and an influence component
driven by activism.15 Specifically, effort spent by activists provides a positive utility (additively
separable from ideology) according to an influence function v(ci), where v
′
(.)> 0, v
′′ ≤ 0. Given
this formulation, I can focus on solely the problem of the median voter. The utility of the median
voter is:
Umv(X,C,µ) =
{
−(XL−µ)2+η .v(cL) if L wins
−(XR−µ)2+η .v(cR) if R wins
This influence function v(.) could be interpreted in different ways. For example, it could be thought
off as a preference shock that is induced by activists on voters, similar to the effect identified by
Madestam et al. (2013). Alternatively, the influence activity may be interpreted as a direct utility
benefit that voters derive from activism.16
The salience of activism is captured by the η > 0 parameter. A greater η implies that activist
participation is weighed more significantly by the median voter, thereby increasing their relevance
in the campaign process. Thus, η represents the “relative importance of activism” to candidates.17
It is useful to define γv(ci) = −ci.v
′′
v′
as the elasticity of marginal influence. γv(ci) describes
the curvature of the influence function and measures the effectiveness of activism in the electoral
process. For sake of exposition, I make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. β > σ
Assumption 2. γp(ci) = γp, γm(ci) = γm
The first assumption implies that the activist is always more extreme than the median voter.18
The second states that the elasticities of participation costs and influence are independent of the
activist contribution ci.19
Timing and Equilibrium concept:
15The National Election Survey (NES) data from the US between 1952-2000 shows evidence for this kind of a
persuasive role. Specifically, the survey data finds that a significant proportion (around 30-40%) of the electorate in
the US indulged in persuasive activism – engaging with potential voters about the candidates’ policy– over these years.
Please refer to Norris (2002) for more.
16This may be a form of informative benefit or persuasion utility that is similar to the role of influence seeking (see
Milgrom and Roberts (1988)) or advertising (see Dixit and Norman (1978)) in the organizational literature. Notice that
the additive separable form of voters’ utility is similar to models that study the role of valence in political competition.
See Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), Bernhardt, Caˆmara and Squintani (2011),
Groseclose (2001) for more on models with an valence component.
17When η = 0, the median voter is unaffected by activism, and the game resembles a variant of the BDS paper in
which candidates with mixed motivations compete for an electoral office, in the presence of uncertainty about median
voter’s ideal preference.
18This phenomenon has been widely documented in the political science literature. See Aldrich (2011) for more
on this.
19For a broad class of power functions of the form cρ , the elasticities are constant.
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1. Candidates L and R simultaneously announce policy platforms X= (XL,XR)
2. Nature draws activists’ ideology β ∼ [β ,1] from a cdf F(.)
3. Activists observe platforms, and simultaneously choose contributions C = (cL,cR) respec-
tively
4. Nature draws the median voter’s bliss point µ from an uniform distribution [−σ ,σ ]
5. The median voter observes (X,C) and decides the winner
All exogenous parameters (α,β ,η ,σ ,b) and the functional forms of m(.) and v(.) are common
knowledge. The players maximize expected-utility, and the notion of equilibrium is Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium in symmetric pure strategies.
4 Optimal Activism
To characterize the activists’ contribution schedules, the behavior of the median voter first needs
to be pinned down. The ideology of the median voter affects the winnability of either candidate.
In particular, the median voter chooses the party which gives a higher payoff, i.e., she prefers
candidate L over candidate R iff,
−(XL−µ)2+ηv(cL)≥−(XR−µ)2+ηv(cR)
Therefore the cutoff ideology µ , below which the median voter will vote for party L is,
µˆ(X,C) =
(XR+XL)
2
+
η
2
v(cL)− v(cR)
(XR−XL)
Let λ (X,C) denote the probability with which candidate L wins when XL 6= XR. Given the
distribution of µ , the probability that candidate L wins is,
λ (X,C) =
1
2
+
(XR+XL)
4σ
+
η
4σ
v(cL)− v(cR)
(XR−XL) ≡ λ (4.1)
Consider the contribution decision of an activist, say AR20. Given a policy pair X and a realiza-
tion of ideology β , AR maximizes the following,
EUAR =−λ (XL−β )2− (1−λ )(XR−β )2−m(cR)
It is straightforward to observe from the equation above that when platforms of candidates are
not differentiated, the activists do not have incentives to participate in the process, implying that
ci = 0. However, when the platforms diverge, interesting trade-off’s emerge.
20The decision problem is symmetric for AL.
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The relationship between the contribution of activist AR and platform X exhibits two key fea-
tures. As XR increases, it means that the candidate R’s policy is closer to that of the activist. How-
ever, by taking a more extreme position, the candidate can differentiate her platform and soften the
effect of activists.21 As a result, the marginal effect of activism (cR) on winnability of L, λ (X,C),
is softened by more polarized platforms, reducing the marginal benefits from increased activism.22
In the same way, when XL becomes more extreme, these incentives switch. Now even though
AR cares about preventing L from winning, the fact that XL is more extreme reduces the marginal
influence of activism on L’s chances of winning.
Lemma 1. When XL 6= XR 6= 0, each activist chooses a level of contribution given by,
m
′
(cL)
v′(cL)
=
η
4σ
.[2β +(XL+XR)]
and
m
′
(cR)
v′(cR)
=
η
4σ
.[2β − (XL+XR)]
Proof. See Appendix A.1
The trade-offs discussed earlier reflects in the equilibrium supply of activism. Two effects
are at play: i) preference-for-moderation effect, and ii) counter-mobilization effect. Specifically,
when one of the candidates becomes more extreme, the party activist supporting that candidate
reduces contributions to the campaign ( ∂cR∂XR < 0 and
∂cL
∂XL
> 0). Activists dislike more extreme plat-
forms, and a willingness to compromise by a candidate -by moving closer to the other candidate’s
platform- increases the marginal influence of activism, thereby increasing participation from one’s
own activist.
In addition, activists also impose a disciplining effect. When one candidate becomes more
extreme, the activist supporting the other candidate counter-mobilizes and increases participation
( ∂cR∂XL < 0 and
∂cL
∂XR
> 0). This stems from the fact that when a candidate polarizes, the expected
ideological loss is higher for the other party’s activist, and the marginal benefits of participation
rises. Thus, activists care about whether the other candidate becomes more extreme. In this sense,
the preferences of party activists are such that it favors greater moderation and compromise from
candidates during the campaign process.
When platforms are symmetric, meaning XR = −XL, the contributions by activists are inde-
pendent of the announced platforms (XL,XR), since XR +XL = 0. This implies that equilibrium
21This softening argument plays a crucial role for the main result in Section 6.
22This is given by λ ′cR =
η
4σ .
v
′
(cR)
(XR−XL) . Notice that as (XR−XL) increases, the marginal influence of activism de-
creases. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) find a similar trade off in a model of electoral competition in which
candidates invest (costly) in valence. Also, see Groseclose (2001) for a similar trade-off between divergent platforms
and valence advantage.
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0−β β−σ σ
XL XR→
|XR−β | ↓
|λ ′cR | ↓
|XR+β | ↑
|λ ′cL | ↓
Figure 1: Activist decision problem: Tradeoffs facing the activist delineated by winnability and
ideological loss.
supply of activism is purely a function of the exogenous parameters of the model – (η ,σ) – and is
independent of the extent of polarization in platforms.23
Lemma 2. When candidate platforms are symmetric, ie XR = −XL, supply of activism is given
by c∗L(β ) = c∗R(β ) = c∗(β ) that solves m
′
(c) = ηβ2σ .v
′
(c). Moreover, the following holds: ∂c
∗
∂η > 0,
∂c∗
∂σ < 0
Notice that the equilibrium supply of activism has a simple structure. The characterization
equates marginal costs and marginal benefits of contribution, resulting in an unique equilibrium of
the activist subgame. Any increase in the relative importance of activism or reduced variance in
median voter’s ideal point shifts the marginal benefit curve up (see Figure 2), thereby increasing
the contributions in equilibrium. However, when party activists diverge, participation increases as
the stakes are now higher for activists. Therefore, any increase in η and β , or a decrease in σ ,
leads to greater participation in equilibrium.24
5 Symmetric Candidate Equilibrium
Candidates anticipate contributions and the winning probability as a function of their chosen plat-
forms. A (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium strategy for a candidate is a policy platform that
maximizes their payoff, given the other candidate’s platform choice and the subsequent play of
the game. I restrict attention to symmetric candidate platforms. Before characterizing equilibrium
platforms with party activists, it would be useful to consider the case when there is no demand
for activists, meaning η = 0. This describes a political environment devoid of activists, and the
23This property is due to the fact that there is no strategic interaction between ideology and the activists’ influence
function v(.). This additive separability in the median voter’s preferences implies that as long as the two platforms are
symmetric on either side of the political spectrum, the optimal contributions of the party activists are unaffected by the
extent of platform polarization.
24 Although participation in equilibrium is positive when platforms are polarized, it is still wasteful, in the sense
that both the activists’ contributions are equal and therefore do not have any relative impact on the winnability of the
candidate. However, the reason why they are positive is precisely that if one activist were to reduce contributions, it
would decrease their candidate’s probability of winning. The other activist, as a consequence, has a greater incentive
to contribute, since the marginal benefits of contributing exceed the marginal costs. This interdependence between
winnability and activism prompts both party activists to contribute a positive level in the campaign, even though in
equilibrium the two contributions cancel each other out, resulting in zero net effect of activism.
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ci
Marg Benefit
K.v
′
(ci)
m
′
(ci)
K = η4σ .[2β ± (XR+XL)]
a
a′
Figure 2: The intersection of the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves determine equilibrium
activism. At a symmetric equilibrium, K = ηβ2σ . Any increase in β or η , or a decrease in σ , pushes
the marginal benefit curve upwards, increasing activism in equilibrium. Notice that the curvature
of the marginal cost function affects the equilibrium activism (points a and a′).
equilibrium is determined by candidates with mixed motivations and median voter uncertainty.25
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium platforms in the absence of activism.
Proposition 1. The electoral game without activism has a symmetric equilibrium (−x¯, x¯) such that,
if α > b4σ then x¯ =
4σα−b
4(α+σ) ; and if α ≤ b4σ then x¯ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
An important point to note in the above proposition is that x¯ < α . This implies that respon-
sible candidates never choose their ideal policy and always moderate in equilibrium. Given this,
introducing ideologically risk averse party activists further changes the incentives for candidates.
On top of targeting the median voter’s ideal policy, candidates also have to cater to the preferences
of activists. As argued earlier, party activists prefer moderation in platforms. This indicates that
candidates may further trade off ideology in order to elicit greater participation from activists by
moderating platforms in equilibrium, irrespective of the extent of the partisan gap between party
activists.
Proposition 2. The electoral game with activism has an unique symmetric pure strategy equilib-
rium in candidate platforms (−x∗,x∗) that solves,
4(α+σ)x2− [4α(σ − 1
2
∫ 1
β
D(β ,c∗(β ))dF(β ))−b]x+ b
2
∫ 1
β
D(β ,c∗(β ))dF(β ) = 0
25The existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in such a set-up has been shown by an earlier work of
Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani (2009). The same arguments can be extended to my analysis with activism.
12
where D(β ,c∗(β )) = ηβ .
c∗(β ).v′(c∗(β ))
γm+γv , such that if α >
b
4(σ− 12
∫ 1
β D(β ,c∗(β ))dF(β ))
then x∗ > 0; if α ≤
b
4(σ− 12
∫ 1
β D(β ,c∗(β ))dF(β ))
, then x∗ = 0. Furthermore, x¯≥ x∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
The equilibrium with activists is more moderate than in the absence of them. This is an inter-
esting finding since it illustrates an important role for political activism. Political activists in rep-
resentative democracies help constrain extreme platforms and build consensus. In the absence of
activists, candidates with mixed motivations would tend to move away from each other and closer
to their preferred platform, causing greater polarization. In polarized societies like the present
day US, activism is indeed good. The inability of activists, unlike lobbies and organized interest
groups, to commit to (implicit) policy contingent contracts26 implies that candidates find common
ground by moderating their platforms.
6 Partisan gap and candidate polarization
The result presented in Proposition 2 implies that the mere presence of ideologically inclined ac-
tivists reduces the polarization of candidate platforms, irrespective of the extent of partisanship
between the activists. An important question that arises then is how does equilibrium polarization
react to increasing levels of partisanship between the two sides’ activists.
In order to capture the notion of partisanship in preferences of activists, I use the idea of first-
order stochastic dominance (FOSD) shift in the distribution of activist ideologies. Specifically,
suppose the activist bliss points are drawn from an alternate distribution with CDF G(.) and differ-
entiable density g, such that ∀t ∈ [β ,1] : G(t)≤ F(t).27
Consequently, candidates while choosing their platforms, face the following trade off. Moving
closer to the ex-ante median is preferred by activists and this increases -in expectation- the extent
of activism. On the other hand, if the candidate chooses to move closer to her preferred ideology, it
increases the payoff conditional on winning. However, by polarizing, the candidate faces the pos-
sibility of lower activism from her own activists, and greater counter-activism from the other side.
The nature of balance between these two forces -increased conditional payoff and lower chances
of winning- depends crucially on the activists’ willingness to engage in the electoral process.
To make the exposition clearer, I will define the activists’ willingness to engage as WT E =
1
γm+γv . That is, willingness to engage is simply the inverse of the sum of elasticities of marginal
cost of participation and marginal influence. This gives us an intuitive way to think about the
participation decision of activists in the electoral process.
26See Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001).
27This way, the activists drawn from G are ex-ante more partisan in a FOSD sense.
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Proposition 3. When the activists’ ideology is drawn from a distribution G, and further if G FOSD
F, the following holds:
(i) equilibrium platforms are less polarized if γv ≤ 1−γm2 ; or WT E ≥ 11−γv
(ii) equilibrium platforms are more polarized if γp > 1−γm2 ; or WT E <
1
1−γv
Proof. See Appendix A.4
There is a non-monotonic relationship between activist polarization and political polarization of
candidates, and the nature of this relationship is captured by the willingness to engage of activists.
To understand this result more deeply, I will present a simple parameterized example. Suppose
the influence function of activism is linear v(ci) = ci and the cost function of activists is a convex
power function of the form m(ci) = c
ρ
i .
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium activism under symmetric platforms, and when one of the
candidates (say R) polarizes and shifts away from the symmetric equilibrium (XR = x+∆x). Notice
that this polarization brings about an increase in activism from AL and a decrease in activism
from own activist AR. Further, the increase in activism from AL is greater when the marginal cost
function has a lower elasticity (concave in the left side figure).
This implies two things. First, as candidates move away from a symmetric equilibrium, they
risk alienating their own activists, while at the same time mobilizing the opposite side’s activists.
Second, the extent of this change in activism-gap depends on the willingness to engage (in this case,
WT E = (ρ−1)). Specifically, when ρ ≤ 2, the marginal cost function (on the left) is concave and
the increase in activism-gap is high. This in turn hurts R’s winnability to the extent where the
marginal benefits of moving closer to his preferred ideology α is offset by the marginal losses
incurred by polarizing (reduced winnability). Therefore, in the case when ρ ≤ 2 (or WT E ≥ 1),
as one of the candidate polarizes, it pushes the two effects – counter-mobilization and preference-
for-moderation – more strongly in favor of the less polarized candidate. The candidates therefore
choose to moderate when activists have a high WT E.28
The opposite is true when the willingness to engage is low (the right side graph of figure 3).
In this case, candidates find it optimal to polarize since doing so does not change the activism-
ga by enough to compensate for the increased gains of moving closer to their preferred platform
(−α,α). Candidates understand this trade-off while announcing their platforms. They recognize
that a lower WT E means that activists do not react to polarization as strongly, and this provides
them with incentives to move closer to their ideal points.
28This kind of political compromise was witnessed in the recent US primary battle between Hillary Clinton and
Bernie Sanders. Clinton, during the course of the primaries, adopted platforms far more progressive than her perceived
ideological moorings (as a centrist candidate). Platforms that resulted in compromise were, e.g., college tuition and
$15 minimum wage. A similar compromise was witnessed in the 2015 New Delhi elections in which both the main
competing parties decided to adopt a variant of the anti-corruption bill, which remained the main campaign issue.
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ci
Marg Benefit
XR = x+∆x; XL =−x
m
′
(ci)
MBL
MBR
ci
Marg Benefit
m
′
(ci)
e′
e′′
XR = x+∆x; XL =−x
d′
d′′
(x,−x)
Figure 3: In the above figure, when R is more extreme (polarizes by ∆x from a symmetric equi-
librium), the marginal benefit curve of activist AR moves down (points d′′ & e′′) while that of
AL moves up (points d′ and e′). Clearly, the greater ∆x is, the greater is the difference in activism
(activism-gap), d′-d′′ and e′-e′′, between the two sides. Notice that this gap is greater (lower) when
the marginal cost function is concave (convex). This illustrates the trade-off between polarization
and the elasticity parameter.
Implications. These results are of fundamental importance in understanding the intricate re-
lationship between party polarization and candidates’ platform polarization. An important impli-
cation of this result is that a widening partisan gap is neither necessary nor sufficient for causing
increased polarization of platforms. Take, for example, the Pew Research Center’s study29 in 2014
that documents this partisanship. To quote, “Today, 92% of Republicans are to the right of the me-
dian Democrat, and 94% of Democrats are to the left of the median Republican”, and further, “But
on every measure of engagement, political participation is strongly related to ideology and parti-
san antipathy; those who hold consistently liberal or conservative views, and who hold strongly
negative views of the other political party, are far more likely to participate in the political process
than the rest of the nation. This results in a consistent “U-shaped” pattern, with higher levels of
engagement on the right and left of the ideological spectrum, and lower levels in the center.” My
finding suggests that polarization in US politics is not driven purely by participation of increasingly
partisan supporters. What is important is the interaction between partisan gap and the willingness
to engage of activists in the electoral process, meaning, a combination of (β ,WT E) is critical in
determining whether polarization increases.
For example, consider the issue of rising income inequality. This may push political activists
towards supporting policies that are more progressive on one side and more conservative on the
other. However, this does not necessarily guarantee that candidates representing their interests
29See http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public.
Also, for a more recent study on partisanship, see http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/27/
the-demographic-trends-shaping-american-politics-in-2016-and-beyond/.
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would further polarize their platforms to reflect this partisanship. In fact, as my analysis suggests,
a compromise could be reached in equilibrium if both parties’ willingness to engage in the political
process is high enough. In this case, any increase in the WT E implies that party activists react
more severely to polarization by either candidate, and this precludes them from polarizing in the
first place, even though activists belonging to either side share more disparate views on the issues.
This result helps refocus attention on the role of party structure in electoral campaigns and
democratic polities. If party activists show a greater willingness to engage with, and persuade,
ordinary voters, then even if their own policy preferences diverge, the fact that there are imminent
risks associated with electoral competition would imply that candidates may adopt more moderate
stances reflecting the risky nature of campaigns. Parties and activists in democratic states could
then provide a natural barrier against polarization as long as they remain actively engaged in the
political process.
Proposition 4. When x∗ > 0, candidate platforms become more extreme if i) candidates’ ideo-
logical polarization α increases; ii) benefits of office b decrease; iii) the relative importance of
activism η decreases; iv) variance in median voter’s ideological preference σ increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.5
The relation between platform divergence and η is along expected lines. The rationale is the
following. As the demand for activism decreases, it implies that voters weight candidate ideology
more heavily compared to activist engagement. This implies activists end up decreasing their par-
ticipation in the political process. Besides, the increased weight on candidate platforms means that
the candidates rely less (in marginal terms) on activist participation. This decreased dependency
on activists, therefore, translates into more divergent platforms in equilibrium.30
Lastly, platform divergence increases when there is greater uncertainty regarding voters’ pref-
erences. This makes intuitive sense in that, ceteris paribus, candidates in the model are trying to
locate the median voter’s bliss point. Remember that greater uncertainty reduces activist partici-
pation because the possibility of more extreme median platforms reduces the marginal benefits for
the activists. As this uncertainty or the variance increases, candidates adjust their platform in a
way so as to account for this reduced participation from party activists and move more closer to
their ideal policy.
7 Welfare implications of activism
In this section, I study the welfare effects of activism and polarization on voters. I address two
questions. First, when does the presence of activists welfare-improving for voters, compared to
30As η goes to zero, notice that the equilibrium platform is the same as the case with no activism. That is, as
η → 0, x∗→ x¯. This can be gleaned by substituting η = 0 into the equilibrium equation in Proposition 2.
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polities without their presence? Second, under what conditions does increased (ex-ante) polariza-
tion among activists adversely affect the welfare of voters?
Consider the ex-ante welfare of voters first under no activism. Let Wv(−x,x) be the welfare of
any voter v under the symmetric equilibrium platforms of the two candidates. Then,
Wv(−x,x) =− 12σ
[ 0∫
−σ
(x+ v+µ)2dµ−
σ∫
0
(x− v−µ)2dµ
]
The sum of all voters’ welfare is given by,
Wtot(−x,x) =− 14σ
1∫
−1
[ 0∫
−σ
(x+ v+µ)2dµ+
σ∫
0
(x− v−µ)2dµ
]
dv
Lemma 3. Under no activism, the welfare of voters is maximized at x = σ2 .
This result follows from Proposition 7 in BDS. When there is uncertainty about the median
voter’s bliss point, voters are better off with a small degree of divergence in platforms, compared
to Downsian convergence on the ex-ante median.
When there are activists engaging voters, they generate a positive welfare effect on voters.
Since in any symmetric equilibrium, the two activists’ contributions cancel each other out and
activism is independent of the symmetric platform choice of candidates, the first best levels of
polarization remain unchanged in the presence of activism.
Given this, it is imperative to characterize the conditions under which the introduction of ac-
tivists is actually welfare improving. From the previous analysis, we know that the presence of
activists moderates platforms of candidates. In this case, any welfare improvement is possible only
if two conditions hold: i) x¯ > σ2 , and ii) the equilibrium with activists (−x∗,x∗) is not low enough
that Wtot(−x¯, x¯) > Wtot(−x∗,x∗). The first condition ensures that in the absence of activism, the
level of polarization is above the social optimal and the second implies that the presence of activists
must not moderate the platforms to below a threshold (given by (σ − x¯)).
Proposition 5. When b < 2σ(α−σ) and x∗ > 4σ2+b4(α+σ) , activism improves welfare of voters. When
either b > 2σ(α − σ) or, b < 2σ(α − σ) and x∗ < 4σ2+b4(α+σ) , the presence of activists hurts the
welfare of voters.
Proof. See Appendix A.6
The presence of activists does not always improve welfare. The reason is that by their pref-
erence for compromise, activists may constrain the choices of candidates to the point where they
are too similar. One way by which this compromise occurs is when one of the candidates adopts
some features of the platform offered by the other, therefore compromising on their ideological
preferences. By doing so, the candidates may end up providing very little choice to the electorate,
harming their welfare.
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σ
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W (−x∗,x∗)
W (0,0) W (−σ ,σ)
(σ − x¯) x¯
x∗ ∈ [σ − x¯, x¯)
Figure 4: The shaded region corresponds to the case when x¯ > σ2 and x
∗ > (σ − x¯).
Lemma 4. Given an equilibrium level of polarization x∗ ∈ (0, σ2 ], any increase in the partisan gap
between activists reduces total welfare when activists’ WT E > 11−γp and improves welfare when
WT E < 11−γp ; and vice versa for x
∗ > σ2 .
Proof. See Appendix A.7
The welfare effects of activist polarization are ambiguous. That is, the impact of activist diver-
gence on overall welfare depends on the extent of prevailing polarization in the political process.
As we observed earlier, when the WT E of activists is high (condition i) of Proposition 3), the
equilibrium level of polarization decreases as activists diverge more. Now, when the level of po-
larization is in the interval [0, σ2 ] (see figure 4), a high WT E implies that activist divergence results
in greater moderation, and this reduces overall welfare.
The implication of this result is that to achieve first best levels of polarization calls for either
lowering or increasing the WT E of activists. A lowering of WT E could be seen as introducing
barriers to participation, or increasing the noise such that activism is rendered ineffective. On the
other hand, an increase in WT E could be interpreted as a way in which the marginal costs are
decreased for activism, and/or increasing the effectiveness of activists. Therefore, by varying the
barriers to participation, the campaign process with activism can indeed lead to welfare improving
outcomes, by varying the exogenous parameters b and η .
Lemma 5. Consider a social planner trying to implement the socially optimal level of polarization.
1. As long as b < 2σ(α−σ), there exists a η∗ such that the first best levels of polarization can be
achieved.
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2. As long as
∫ 1
β D(β ,c(β ))dF(β )<
σ
α (α−σ), there exists a b∗ such that the social planner can
implement the first best levels of polarization.
Proof. See Appendix A.8
8 Extensions
8.1 Activism in Noisy campaigns
Suppose the policy platforms of candidates are observed with noise by the median voter, and
activists play an informative role (see Austen-Smith (1987)). That is, activists inform the median
voter of the precise position of their candidate’s platform. If Xi is the true position of the candidate,
the policy observed by the median voter is X˜i = Xi+ηi, where ηi is a random variable (noise term)
with expectation zero and variance σ2i . Contributions from activists reduces the variance of the
noise term. If ci is the contribution from the activist, then σ2i = a(ci). To simplify analysis, I
assume that the median voter’s ideology is drawn from an uniform distribution on [−1,1]. Further,
activist ideologies are known at the time of candidates announcing platforms, and it is fixed at
(−β ,β ).
Additionally, following assumptions are made on the functional form of a(.)31: a′(.) < 0,
a′′(.) > 0, a′′′(.) < 0 and a(0) > 0. The first two conditions ensure that as activists contribute
more, the variance of noise function is decreasing, and convex. The subsequent condition ensures
the concavity of the marginal variance of noise reduction, and the last condition states that, in the
absence of activism, there is a positive level of noise in platforms, meaning voters imperfectly
observe the platform of candidates.
This formulation naturally implies that greater activist participation is beneficial for candidates
since it reduces the variance of the platforms, and since the voter is risk-averse, less variance is
preferred. Activists or volunteers, then, have an important role in conveying - through door-to-door
canvassing or phone calls - the true policy stance of their candidate.
Before presenting the results, it is important to glean the role of noise reduction function.
Remember, activism is now not a persuasive tool, but restricted to only reducing the variance of
the noisy platform. I introduce the parameter γn(c) to define the efficiency of activism in reducing
the noisiness of platforms. That is, Efficiency of Marginal Noise Reduction, γn(c) =−c.a
′′
a′
. As in
the baseline model, the willingness to engage is defined by WT EN = 1γm+γn .
Proposition 6. In a noisy electoral campaign with activism, there exists an unique symmetric
equilibrium in candidate platforms. Furthermore,
i. ∂x∂β < 0 if γn <
1−γm
2 ; ii.
∂x
∂β > 0 if γn >
1−γm
2
31We additionally assume that the noise reduction mechanism a(.), is the same for both candidates.
19
Proof. See Appendix B.1
Proposition 8 shows that the main equilibrium and comparative statics result holds. The details
can be found in Appendix B.
8.2 The role of big money
Though the reliance on grassroots activists is an important avenue of campaigning, big money cam-
paign donations, in the form of PACs or super PACs, have played an increasingly important role.
McCarthy, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) find that large contributions and contributors on average
were more extreme32 (on either side of the political spectrum), and moreover, they tended to favor
extreme candidates. The presence of such contributions provides the candidates with alternate re-
sources with which to engage and influence voters - say, through direct political communication
and advertisements targeting voters. Therefore, big money contributions act as a substitute for
activism, reducing the dependence of candidates on grass-roots activists. Therefore, when candi-
dates have access to big money, their reliance on activists goes down. This in turn may provoke
candidates to polarize away from each other, and towards more extreme ideologies.
To see this mechanism, I will modify the model to consider the role of big money.33 Suppose
S is the available contributions for either candidate. Then, the candidates have two goods that are
employed for influence in elections – activist participation ci and money S. Moreover, I modify the
influence function to include the money parameter. That is, v(S,ci) is the total influence generated
by campaigning, such that v2(.)> 0, v22(.)< 0, v1(.)> 0, v11(.)< 0, and v12(.)< 0. The concavity
assumption holds as before, and the last assumption states that S and ci are strategic substitutes.
This makes intuitive sense. Candidates need money to spend on advertisements, hiring campaign
staff, on personalized communication to voters, and so on. Therefore, money supplements the
traditional grassroots campaign of activists.
What this suggests is that the presence of big money may crowd out the role of activism, thereby
decreasing the level of participation. This crowding out of activists may then drive candidates to
polarize for much the same reasons as discussed earlier. Any decrease in the marginal effect of
activism reduces the candidates’ incentive to compromise. This leads to greater polarization in
equilibrium.
Lemma 6. In the presence of big money in campaigns, the equilibrium polarization and partici-
pation are such that, i)dc
∗
dS < 0 and ii)
dx∗
dS > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.2
32Please refer to chapter 5 of MPR.
33I specifically abstract away from the strategic interaction of big donors. Instead, I assume that candidates are
given a fixed sum of (big money) contributions exogenously by these donors. This can be interpreted as a pure
electoral motive of giving campaign contributions (see Jacobson (1985)).
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Lemma 3 shows how big money has a crowding out effect on activism and pushes platforms to
further extremes as a result. The fact that this kind of money reaches more extreme candidates in
the first place would only exacerbate its effect on political polarization (dx
∗
dS ,
dx∗
dα > 0). As a result,
this suggests a rationale for curbing this kind of big money spending by individual contributors or
organized groups34. My analysis suggests curbing the use of money and increasing the dependence
on activists. This could help counter balance the current trend of the excessive role of big money
in the political process and potentially reduce platform polarization.
9 Discussion and concluding remarks
I have analyzed a model of political competition that addresses the question of whether, and how,
the participation of activists in the electoral process affects political polarization. I find that when
activists are price-takers in Aldrichian sense, candidate platforms are always more moderate than
the case without activists. That is, the political process with activists yields a greater compro-
mise between the two candidates. The inability of activists to make policy contingent (implicit)
contributions and commit to quid pro quo contracts35 implies that candidates take into account
the preferences of activists when announcing policy platforms, and this leads to moderation in
platforms.
Moreover, I show that when the distribution of activists become more polarized, and their will-
ingness to engage is above a threshold, the equilibrium platforms of candidates tend to converge.
Therefore, political polarization decreases as partisanship between activists increases. This finding
provides a clear testable threshold on the willingness to engage of activists. Below this threshold,
any increase in divergence between activists must impact the candidate platforms by polarizing
them. The implication of this result is that activist polarization, on its own, is insufficient to ex-
plain political polarization. The combination of activist partisanship and the willingness to engage
in the political process together determine the extent of political polarization. The other testable
result of my analysis is that polarization reduces as the demand for activism increases. That is,
there is a negative correlation between polarization and the salience of activism in campaigns.
The willingness to engage can be reconciled by looking at the supply side factors that affect
activism. On the supply front, one possible interpretation of the willingness to engage parameter
is that it captures the costs incurred by activists during the electoral process. Specifically, modern
day campaigns, especially in the US, happen over a long period of time. Electoral cycles are a
continuous and arduous process, taking up a lot of time and resources on the part of candidates
and activists, starting with the announcement of platforms up until election day. In some sense, the
elasticity parameter reflects the marginal costs involved, and captures the length of the electoral
34The so called “527 group” spending, e.g., places no upper bounds on how much and to whom to contribute. Some
prominent ones include Club for Growth, MoveOn.org, New Democrat Network, among others.
35For more on organized interest groups and lobbies that are able to commit to such policy contingent contracts,
see Grossman and Helpman (1996), and Morton, Myerson et al. (1992).
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campaign cycle. If this is indeed the case, then local (municipal bodies or city councils) elections
where stakes are lower and the length of the campaign is substantially shorter, may have lower
levels of polarization compared to state or federal elections, controlling for activist ideologies.
Some important welfare implications emerge from my analysis. Specifically, I establish that
when political polarization is very high, increased divergence among activists can actually be wel-
fare improving for voters as long as the willingness to engage for the activists is high. That is,
highly polarized polities may benefit from activism in campaigns, irrespective of the ideologi-
cal inclinations of the activists. Even when activists become more diverged, they could end up
moderating platforms further, and increase voter welfare. However, on the downside, democratic
societies with high levels of participation and less polarization may indeed provide lesser choice
(decreased polarization) to the voters, making them worse off in welfare terms.
My welfare analysis also raises an important point that is related to the issue of party strength
and polarization in democracies. Specifically, several studies (e.g., Norris (2002, 2007), Dalton
and Wattenberg (2002)) have pointed out the phenomenon of decreasing political engagement and
weakening party structures in advanced economies. My work suggests that this may be due to
lack of incentives to associate with political outfits (high marginal costs, say), or alternatively, a
result of reduced demand for them (crowding out effect of big money). The empirical evidence
suggests that the willingness to engage of the wider electorate in activism has decreased over time
in industrialized nations.36 In the case of the US, it may be that the decline of traditional partici-
pation is closely linked to the demand for such activism.37 For example, modern communication
and messaging techniques employed by candidates preclude the need for a more grass-roots cam-
paign. The candidates rely instead on big campaign expenditure to communicate directly to the
electorate. Activists, who associate with parties and act as intermediaries, get crowded out in the
political process. The polarization in US politics, therefore, can be pinned down to such a mix of
supply-side and demand-side considerations of activism.
Finally, my theoretical findings suggests a possible link between publicly funded elections and
political polarization. Public funding of campaigns could potentially have two effects. First, it
reduces the crowding out effect of big money on activism. This would increase the reliance of
candidates on activists and tilt the balance of demand towards smaller volunteers and a grass-
roots campaign. Second, public funding38 may automatically reduce the length of campaign cycle,
encouraging supporters with high marginal costs of participation to contribute effectively. These
two effects, according to the predictions of my model, would decrease the levels of polarization
36Refer to Dalton and Wattenberg (2002), Schmitt and Holmberg (1995), and Mair and Van Biezen (2001) for a
comprehensive account of the decline in partisanship in western democracies.
37See Whiteley and Seyd (2002); Seyd and Whiteley (2004) for evidence concerning the reduced demand for
activists in Britain’s political process.
38Some other prominent advantages of public funding are that it reduces candidates’ dependence on pernicious
interest group considerations, and possibly decrease the incumbency advantage. In US, the states of Maine and Arizona
have had publicly funded state legislature elections. See the report by Government Accountability Office (GAO) for
more on this, http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/305079.pdf.
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and improve welfare of voters. Therefore, curbing independent expenditures (e.g., restrictions on
PACs and super-PACs spending) by introducing stricter laws, akin to ones previously articulated
by Prat (2002) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2012), and simultaneously introducing publicly funded
campaigns would act as a useful institutional reform to encourage wider participation and bringing
down political polarization.
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A Proofs - Benchmark model
All the proofs are carried out for candidate R and activist AR, and are symmetric for candidate L
and activist AL.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider activist AR and their contribution decision. Given candidate R’s win probability, the
expected utility of activist AR whose ideological bliss point is at β is,
E[UAR(X,cR,β )] =−λ (XL−β )2− (1−λ )(XR−β )2−m(cR)
Taking the first order condition and rearranging yields,
m
′
(cR)
v′(cR)
=
η
4σ
.[2β − (XL+XR)] (A.1)
An analogous argument holds for the activist AL.
m
′
(cL)
v′(cL)
=
η
4σ
.[2β +(XL+XR)] (A.2)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
When η = 0, the win probability of candidate R is just 1− λ = 12 −
(XR+XL)
4σ . Each candidate
chooses a platform to maximize their payoffs, taking as given the platform chosen by the other
candidate. The SPNE is such a pair of platform choices that maximizes the expected utility of both
the candidates in the first stage. Let us consider candidate R.
E[UCR (X ,α)] =−λ (XL−α)2− (1−λ )(XR−α)2+(1−λ )b
Supposing that candidate L chooses XL = −x. Taking the FOC and evaluating the expression at
(−x,x),
λ ′XR [4αx+b]− (α− x) = 0
where λ ′XR |(−x,x)= 14σ
Solving this gives us x¯ = 4σα−b4(α+σ) . If α >
b
4σ , then x¯ > 0 follows from the expression.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
In the case of η > 0, the win-probabilities of both candidates are affected by activism. Specifically,
Pr(L wins) = λ (X,C) where X= (XL,XR) and C=
(
cL(X ,β ),cR(X ,β )
)
. Candidate Rs expected
utility can then be expressed as the following:
Eβ
[
UCR (X ,α)
]
=−
1∫
β
[
λ (X ,C)(XL−α)2+(1−λ (X ,C))
(
(XR−α)2−b
)]
dF(β )
A SPNE in pure strategies is a pair of policies X∗ = (X∗L ,X∗R) such that,
max
XR
Eβ
[
UCR (X ,α)
]
sub ject to
λ (X ,C) =
1
2
+
(XR+XL)
4σ
+
η
4σ
v
(
cL(X ,β )
)− v(cR(X ,β ))
(XR−XL)
cL(X ,β ) solves A.2
cR(X ,β ) solves A.1
For sake of exposition, I will refer to λ = λ (X ,C). The FOC of candidate Rs problem is then given
by the equation,
−
1∫
β
[
λ
′
XR
(
(XL−α)2− (XR−α)2+b
)
+2(1−λ )
(
XR−α
)]
dF(β ) = 0 (A.3)
where,
λ ′XR =
1
4σ
+
η
4σ
[
(XR−XL)
(
v
′
(cL). dcLdXR − v
′
(cR) dcRdXR
)− (v(cL)− v(cR))
(XR−XL)2
]
Applying implicit function theorem to equations A.1 and A.2, we can compute dcRdXR and
dcL
dXR
re-
spectively.
dcR
dXR
=
η
4σ
v
′
(cR)
η
4σ (2β − (XL+XR))v
′′
(cR)−m
′′
(cR)
(A.4)
dcL
dXR
=− η
4σ
v
′
(cL)
η
4σ (2β +(XL+XR))v
′′
(cL)−m
′′
(cL)
(A.5)
Since I am interested in a symmetric equilibrium of the form, X= (−x,x), the equations A.3, A.4
and A.5 simplify to,
1∫
β
[
λ ′XR
∣∣
(−x,x) [4αx+b]+2(1−λ )(x−α)
]
dF(β ) = 0 (A.6)
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dcR
dXR
∣∣∣∣
(−x,x)
=
η
4σ
v
′
(c)
ηβ
2σ v
′′
(c)−m′′(c)
=− dcL
dXR
∣∣∣∣
(−x,x)
The change in win-probability λ at (−x,x) is,
λ ′XR =
1
4σ
[
1− η
2
4σx
(v′(c))2(ηβ
2σ v
′′(c)−m′′(c))
]
(A.7)
At (−x,x), the supply of activism is c(β ) that solves m′(c) = ηβ2σ .v
′
(c). Simplifying the above
expression and using the fact that γm = cm
′′
m′
and γv =−c v
′′
v′
,
⇒ λ ′XR =
1
4σ
[1+
η
2βx
cv
′
(c)
γm+ γv
]> 0
Defining D(β ,c(β )) = ηβ .
c(β ).v′(c(β ))
γm+γv , we can rewrite the above as λ
′
XR =
1
4σ [1+
1
2xD(β ,c(β ))].
Further, we also know that at (−x,x), λ (X ,C) = 12 . Substituting this into equation A.6, we get:
1
4σ
1∫
β
(
1+
1
2x
D(β ,c(β ))
)
(4αx+b)dF(β ) = (α− x) (A.8)
This yields us the required condition,
4(α+σ)x2−
[
4α
(
σ − 1
2
∫ 1
β
D(β ,c(β ))dF(β )
)−b]x+ b
2
∫ 1
β
D(β ,c(β ))dF(β ) = 0 (A.9)
To simplify exposition, I will hereafter refer to
∫ 1
β D(β ,c(β ))dF(β ) as DF . Notice that x = 0 if
4α
(
σ − 12DF
)
−b < 0. This implies that α ≤ b
4
(
σ− 12 DF
) for x∗ = 0.
Further, x is decreasing in DF . As a result, when η = 0 and DF = 0 the resulting equilibrium
x¯ > xDF>0. This proves proposition 2.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove that when the ideology of activists (−β ,β ) increases in a FOSD sense, the equilibrium
platforms converge, we only need to show that under a distribution G that FOSD F , the following
holds:
∫ 1
β
D(β ,c(β ))dG(β )≥
∫ 1
β
D(β ,c(β ))dF(β )
But, from the definition of FOSD, the above expression is true only if D(β ,c(β )) is weakly in-
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creasing in β . That is DG ≥ DF iff,
dD(β ,c(β ))
dβ
=
∂D
∂β
+
∂D
∂c
.
∂c
∂β
≥ 0 (A.10)
Given D(β ,c(β )) = ηβ .
c(β ).v′(c(β ))
γm+γv and c(β ) solves m
′
(c) = ηβ2σ .v
′
(c), applying implicit function
theorem to the above expressions gives us,
∂D
∂β
=− η
β 2
.
c.v′(c)
γm+ γv
=− 1
β
D(β ,c(β ))
∂c
∂β
=−η
σ
v′(c)[ηβ
σ .v
′′(c)−m′′(c)] = 1β c(γm+ γv)
⇒ ∂c
∂β
=
D(β ,c(β ))
ηv′(c)
∂D
∂c
=
η
β
(cv′′(c)+ v′(c))
(γm+ γv)
⇒ ∂D
∂c
=
η .v′(c)
β
(1− γv)
(γm+ γv)
Combining these expressions and substituting back into equation A.10, we get,
dD
dβ
= D
[ 1
η .v′(c)
∂D
∂c
− 1
β
]
Therefore, dDdβ ≥ 0 if
∂D
∂c
≥ η .v
′(c)
β
⇒ (1− γv)
(γm+ γv)
≥ 1
The above condition simplifies to γv ≤ 1−γm2 . A similar argument follows for the other case. This
completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The comparative statics result with respect to α and b follows from Bernhardt, Duggan and Squin-
tani (2009). I will therefore concentrate on the parameters η and σ .
From the equilibrium equation A.9, let
Φ(x;α,η ,σ ,b) = 4(α+σ)x2− [4α(σ − 1
2
DF
)−b]x+ b
2
DF (A.11)
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From implicit function theorem, dxdη =−
dΦ
dη
dΦ
dx
.
The following holds: dφdx > 0 at the equilibrium (−x,x). To see this,
dφ
dx
= 8(α+σ)x− [4α(σ − 1
2
DF)−b]
That is, dφdx > 0 iff x >
[4α(σ− 12 DF )−b]
8(α+σ) . But,
x =
1
8(α+σ)
[(
4α(σ − 1
2
DF)−b
)
+
√(
4α(σ − 1
2
DF)−b
)2−8b(α+σ)DF]
⇒ x = [4α(σ −
1
2DF)−b]
8(α+σ)
+
√
[4α(σ − 12DF)−b]
2−8b(α+σ)DF
8(α+σ)
Therefore it holds that dφdx > 0. The sign of
dΦ
dη determines the sign of
dx
dη . But
dΦ
dη =
dΦ
dDF
.dDFdη .
Further, it is straightforward to observe that dΦdDF > 0. Therefore, we can conclude that
dx
dη < 0 if
dDF
dη > 0. We check for the sign of the derivative
dD(β ,c(β ))
dη .
dD(.)
dη
=
∂D(.)
∂c
.
∂c
∂η
+
∂D(.)
∂η
Since ∂c∂η ,
∂D(.)
∂η and
∂D(.)
∂c > 0, it must be that
dD(.)
dη > 0 and
dDF
dη > 0 which further implies that
dx
dη < 0.
By a similar argument, the sign of dxdσ depends on
dD(.)
dσ . But
dD(.)
dσ =
∂D(.)
∂c
∂c
∂σ . Since
∂c
∂σ < 0, this
implies that dD(.)dσ < 0 and
dx
dσ > 0. This completes the proof.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Notice that the total welfare of voters is symmetric around σ2 such that Wtot(0,0) =Wtot(−σ ,σ).
This means that the welfare function is increasing in the interval [0, σ2 ] and decreasing in the in-
terval (σ2 ,σ ]. This, combined with the fact that activism reduces platform divergence, implies that
for the presence of activism to be welfare improving, a necessary condition is that the candidate
platforms in the absence of activism must be above the social optimum. This is guaranteed when
x¯ = 4σα−b4(α+σ) >
σ
2 . Simplifying this gives us the required condition. However, this condition is not
sufficient for welfare improvement. The reason is that activism could potentially moderate the
platforms to an extent that it reduces the overall welfare. For this to not happen, it must be that
the platforms under activism must be above a threshold. This threshold is easily calculated using
the symmetry property of the welfare functions. Specifically, as long as x∗ > (σ − 4σα−b4(α+σ)), the
presence of activists improves welfare compared to the no activists case. This gives us the required
conditions. It is easy to observe that when either or both of these fail, the introduction of activists
reduces welfare of voters unambiguously. This completes the proof.
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A.7 Proof of Lemma 5
When the levels of polarization induced by activism is in the interval (0, σ2 ), the welfare function
is increasing in x. This implies that as β increases, and WT E is above the threshold 1(1−γv) , the
candidate platforms in equilibrium decrease (or converge towards each other). This reduces the
welfare of voters as a result. The opposite holds when WT E < 1(1−γv) , as in this case the polar-
ization of activists induces more divergence in candidate platforms, leading to improved welfare.
Similar arguments hold when the levels of polarization is above σ2 .
A.8 Proof for Lemma 6
To prove the first part, notice that as η → 0, the equilibrium polarization of the electoral game
converges to x¯. When b < 2σ(α−σ), the equilibrium platform is x¯ > σ2 . But, since dxdη < 0, it is
always possible to find a η∗ > 0 such that the equilibrium polarization falls to the social optimal
σ
2 .
In a similar way, as b→ 0, the equilibrium polarization is such that lim
b→0
x = α(σ−
1
2 DF )
(α+σ) . And, as
long as this is above the social optimal levels, the social planner can always increase the benefits
of office and achieve the social optimum levels of polarization (since dxdb < 0). This completes the
proof.
B Proofs - Extensions
B.1 Activism and Noisy Campaigns
Suppose, for sake of exposition, σ = 1. The solution to the electoral model is solved backwards,
as previously. As before, we present the results for candidate (and activist) R.
The median voter observes the platforms with a noise: X˜L = XL+ηL, X˜R = XR+ηR.
Voter prefers candidate L if, E[−(X˜L−µ)2]> E[−(X˜R−µ)2]
⇔ E[(XL−µ)2+η2L +2ηL(XL−µ)]6 E[(XR−µ)2+η2R+2ηR(XR−µ)]
⇔ E(η2L)−E(η2R)6 (XR−µ)2− (XL−µ)2
⇔ a(cL)−a(cR)6 (XR−µ)2− (XL−µ)2
µ 6 (XR+XL)2 +
a(cR)−a(cL)
2(XR−XL)
The win-probability for Candidate L is λ = 12 +
(XR+XL)
4 +
a(cR)−a(cL)
4(XR−XL) .As in the original model, the
the equilibrium condition for participation is
m′(cR)
a′(cR)
=
[XR+XL−2β ]
4
(B.1)
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By symmetry, the equivalent condition for activist L is,
m′(cR)
a′(cR)
=− [XR+XL+2β ]
4
(B.2)
At the symmetric equilibrium (−x,x), equations B.1 and B.2 reduce to m′(c)a′(c) =−β2 . Let D(β ,c(β ))=
− 1β . ca
′(c)
γm+γn ≈ D. Then, the equation that solves for the symmetric equilibrium is given by the fol-
lowing:
4(α+1)x2− (4α(1− 1
2
D)−b)x+ b
2
D = 0 (B.3)
m′(c)
a′(c)
=−β
2
(B.4)
Together, the above two equations determine the symmetric equilibrium platform of candidates,
and mobilization by activists. The dependence of equilibrium platform x on α and b are along the
lines of the main model. To derive comparative statics with respect to β , let Φ = 4(α + 1)x2−
(4α−b−2αD)x+ b2D.
dx
dβ
=−
dΦ
dβ
dΦ
dx
=−
dΦ
dβ
+ve
dΦ
dβ
=
dΦ
dD
[
∂D
∂β
+
∂D
∂c
∂c
∂β
]
The rest of the proof follows from arguments similar to one in Proposition 3. The sign of ∂Φ∂β
depends on the expression (−2+ 1+γmγm+γn ), which is greater than zero when γn <
1−γm
2 . When this is
satisfied, ∂Φ∂β > 0 and further,
∂x
∂β < 0. When the sign of this inequality is reversed, that is γn >
1−γm
2 ,
then ∂x∂β > 0. This concludes the analysis.
B.2 The role of big money in campaigns
The participation in equilibrium is modified to
m′(c) =
η .β
2σ
.v′2(S,c)
Applying implicit function theorem yields, dcdS =−
ηβ
2σ v
′′
12(S,c)
ηβ
2σ .v
′′
22(S,c)−m′′(c)
< 0.
Similarly, the equilibrium is just the modified equation where,
D(c,η ,β ,S) =
η
β
.
c.P
′
2(S,c)
γm(c)+ γ p(c)
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The sign of dDdS determines the sign of
dx
dS , as before.
dD
dS =
∂D(.)
∂c
∂c
∂S +
∂D(.)
∂S
Since ∂D(.)∂S < 0 and
∂c
∂S < 0, and from our earlier assumption on WT E, it is true that
dD
dS < 0. This
further implies that dxdS > 0.
References
Aldrich, John H. 1983a. “A Downsian spatial model with party activism.” The American Political
Science Review, 974–990.
Aldrich, John H. 1983b. “A spatial model with party activists: implications for electoral dynam-
ics.” Public Choice, 41(1): 63–100.
Aldrich, John H. 2011. Why Parties?: a second look. University of Chicago Press.
Aragones, Enriqueta, and Thomas R Palfrey. 2002. “Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model
with a favored candidate.” Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1): 131–161.
Ashworth, Scott, and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2009. “Elections with platform and valence
competition.” Games and Economic Behavior, 67(1): 191–216.
Austen-Smith, David. 1987. “Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting.”
Public choice, 54(2): 123–139.
Austen-Smith, David. 1995. “Campaign contributions and access.” American Political Science
Review, 566–581.
Baron, David P. 1989. “Service-induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(1): 45–72.
Baron, David P. 1994. “Electoral competition with informed and uniformed voters.” American
Political Science Review, 33–47.
Bernhardt, Dan, John Duggan, and Francesco Squintani. 2007. “Electoral competition with
privately-informed candidates.” Games and Economic Behavior, 58(1): 1–29.
Bernhardt, Dan, John Duggan, and Francesco Squintani. 2009. “The case for responsible par-
ties.” American Political Science Review, 103(4): 570.
Bernhardt, Dan, Odilon Caˆmara, and Francesco Squintani. 2011. “Competence and ideology.”
The Review of Economic Studies, rdq019.
Bernheim, B Douglas, and Michael D Whinston. 1986. “Menu auctions, resource allocation,
and economic influence.” The quarterly journal of economics, 1–31.
31
Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate. 1997. “An economic model of representative democracy.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1): 85–114.
Black, Duncan. 1986. The theory of committees and elections. Springer.
Calvert, Randall L. 1985. “Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: Candidate motiva-
tions, uncertainty, and convergence.” American Journal of Political Science, 69–95.
Coate, Stephen. 2004. “Political competition with campaign contributions and informative adver-
tising.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(5): 772–804.
Dalton, Russell J, and Martin P Wattenberg. 2002. Parties without partisans: Political change
in advanced industrial democracies. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Dixit, Avinash, and Victor Norman. 1978. “Advertising and welfare.” The Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, 1–17.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. “An economic theory of democracy.”
Feddersen, Timothy, and Alvaro Sandroni. 2006a. “The calculus of ethical voting.” Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, 35(1): 1–25.
Feddersen, Timothy, and Alvaro Sandroni. 2006b. “A theory of participation in elections.” The
American Economic Review, 96(4): 1271–1282.
Feddersen, Timothy, and Faruk Gul. 2014. “Polarization and Income Inequality: A Dynamic
Model of Unequal Democracy.” Working Paper.
Groseclose, Tim. 2001. “A model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advan-
tage.” American Journal of Political Science, 862–886.
Grossman, Gene M, and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” The American Eco-
nomic Review, 84(4): 833–850.
Grossman, Gene M, and Elhanan Helpman. 1996. “Electoral competition and special interest
politics.” The Review of Economic Studies, 63(2): 265–286.
Grossman, Gene M, and Elhanan Helpman. 1999. “Competing for endorsements.” American
Economic Review, 501–524.
Grossman, Gene M, and Elhanan Helpman. 2001. Special interest politics. The MIT Press.
Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2009. “Partisan politics and election failure with igno-
rant voters.” Journal of Economic Theory, 144(1): 146–174.
32
Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2012. “The war of information.” The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 79(2): 707–734.
Herrera, Helios, and Cesar Martinelli. 2006. “Group formation and voter participation.” Theo-
retical Economics, 1(4): 461–487.
Herrera, Helios, David K Levine, and Ce´sar Martinelli. 2008. “Policy platforms, campaign
spending and voter participation.” Journal of Public Economics, 92(3): 501–513.
Herrera, Helios, Massimo Morelli, and Salvatore Nunnari. 2015. “Turnout Across Democra-
cies.” American Journal of Political Science.
Herrera, Helios, Massimo Morelli, and Thomas Palfrey. 2014. “Turnout and power sharing.”
The Economic Journal, 124(574): F131–F162.
Jacobson, Gary C. 1985. “Money and votes reconsidered: Congressional elections, 1972–1982.”
Public choice, 47(1): 7–62.
Madestam, Andreas, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger, and David Yanagizawa-Drott. 2013. “Do
Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement*.” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 128(4): 1633–1685.
Mair, Peter, and Ingrid Van Biezen. 2001. “Party membership in twenty European democracies,
1980-2000.” Party politics, 7(1): 5–21.
McCarthy, Nolan, Keith T Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.[End Page 791].
Meyer, Margaret, Paul Milgrom, and John Roberts. 1992. “Organizational prospects, influence
costs, and ownership changes.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1(1): 9–35.
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1988. “An economic approach to influence activities in orga-
nizations.” American Journal of sociology, S154–S179.
Milgrom, Paul R. 1988. “Employment contracts, influence activities, and efficient organization
design.” The Journal of Political Economy, 42–60.
Morton, Rebecca B. 1991. “Groups in rational turnout models.” American Journal of Political
Science, 758–776.
Morton, Rebecca B, Roger B Myerson, et al. 1992. Campaign spending with impressionable
voters. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern
University.
33
Norris, Pippa. 2002. Democratic phoenix: Reinventing political activism. Cambridge University
Press.
Norris, Pippa. 2007. “Political activism: New challenges, new opportunities.” The Oxford hand-
book of comparative politics, 628–652.
Osborne, Martin J, and Al Slivinski. 1996. “A model of political competition with citizen-
candidates.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1): 65–96.
Palfrey, Thomas R, and Howard Rosenthal. 1983. “A strategic calculus of voting.” Public
Choice, 41(1): 7–53.
Palfrey, Thomas R, and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. “Voter participation and strategic uncer-
tainty.” American Political Science Review, 79(01): 62–78.
Prat, Andrea. 2002. “Campaign advertising and voter welfare.” The Review of Economic Studies,
69(4): 999–1017.
Riker, William H, and Peter C Ordeshook. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” Ameri-
can political science review, 62(01): 25–42.
Schmitt, Hermann, and So¨ren Holmberg. 1995. “Political parties in decline?”
Seyd, Patrick, and Paul Whiteley. 2004. “British party members an overview.” Party Politics,
10(4): 355–366.
Shachar, Ron, and Barry Nalebuff. 1999. “Follow the leader: Theory and evidence on political
participation.” American Economic Review, 525–547.
Vira´g, Ga´bor. 2008. “Playing for your own audience: Extremism in two-party elections.” Journal
of Public Economic Theory, 10(5): 891–922.
Whiteley, Paul, and Patrick Seyd. 2002. High-intensity participation: the dynamics of party
activism in Britain. University of Michigan Press.
Wittman, Donald. 1983. “Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternative theories.” The Ameri-
can political science review, 142–157.
34
